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Parallel with the development of National Defense and
Security, the Royal Thai Navy has planned to build many
ships equipped with modern weapon systems. To provide the
petty officers for operating and maintaining these new
ships, the Royal Thai Navy faces several problems which have
not yet been solved.
This thesis studies manpower requirements for the
Operating Fleet. The first part of the thesis determines
the factors which cause the problems. The second part exam-
ines the factors and trends affecting patty officer
recruiting and retention. The third part examines policy
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2.1 Organization of the Operating Fleet 13
— I. INTBODOCTION
A. GEHEHAL
Military policymakers will soon be faced with hard deci-
sions in adjusting to the realities of military manpower
requirements. Manpower shortfalls, changes in quality and
attitudes of recruits, and low retention rates in critical
occupational specialties will force major changes. Rith
more and more pressure on the Navy budget as an after-effect
of the rising personnel costs over the past faw years and
the additional cost of the manpower requirements for the
expansion of the Naval fleet, the Navy can no longer afford
the luxury of implementing costly, unproved recruitment and
retention strategies. The Navy must take steps to use its
human resources more effectively.
The P.oyal Thai Navy has proposed an expansion of naval
forces as part of its plan to revitalize the defense
capacity. Today the Navy*s Fleet is manned by 2900 active-
duty petty officers. By 1989 the Navy aims to have 11 ships
more. That force will require an increase in active-duty
petty officers of 287 persons. In addition to the petty
officer requirement for the expansion of the naval fleet,
the Boyal Thai Navy has planned to fill the vacancies of
current petty officer shortage of 665 persons during the
next five years in order to improve the effectiveness and
readiness of the naval forces. In providing manpower for a
larger fleet, the Navy*s recruiting efforts will be prima-
rily concerned with the supply of Navy personnel. The Navy
must compete successfully in the labor market to attract
high quality personnel for a growing number of recruits and
to retain quanlified personnel-
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS
The Royal Thai Navy needs to provide the manpower to
fill the vacancies of the current fleet manpower and the
additional manpower requirements for the expansion of the
Fleet. The objective of this thesis is to analyze the
methods which can provide effective manpower management in
order to meet the Navy manpower goals. Specific objectives
are ;
(1) To determine the quantity of petty officer require-
ments for the Operating Fleet during the build up
period.
(2) To determine the factors affecting petty officer
supply and petty officer retention during the build
up period.
(3) To examine trends of the petty officer recruitment
and petty officer retention during the build up
period.
(4) To examine the policy options that can affect the
quantity, quality and skills of personnel recruited
and retained, these policy options can help the Navy
ensure that high or higher quality individuals will
enter the Navy.
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
In order to analyze the manpower problems of the
Operating Fleet of the Eoyal Thai Navy, U.S. manpower tech-
niques are applied to solve the problems. This thesis is
divided into six chapters.
Chapter One, the introduction, presents the objective
and the scope of the thesis.
Chapter Two describes the background of the Royal Thai
Navy, the organization of the operating fleet, and the
strength of forces.
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chapter Three presents a brief description of the fleet
expansion and fleet manpower requirements.
Chapter ^Dur presents a determination of the factors
affecting the personnel recruited and retained. This
chapter includes the determination of personnel recruiting
trends.
Chapter Five examines the policy options that could
raise the ^^uantity, quality, and skills of personnel
recruited and retained.
Chapter Six is the conclusion.
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_ II. BACKGHQJNP
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EOTAL THAI NAVY SHIPS
Thailand, with a population of 44 million, located in
South East Asia near the cominunist controlled countries of
Cambodia and Vietnam, feels the need to equip its Navy with
modern weapons in order to ensure its National Defense.
Modern weapons are gradually being installed on the new
Eoyal Thai Navy Ships. Some old ships will soon reach their
end of service and new ships equipped with modern weapons
will replace them. At present the Royal Thai Navy is manned
by 32,200 active-duty personnel (including 14,000 marines).
The Navy plans to develop the naval fleet during the next 5
years. It's shipbuilding plan for 1986-1990 includes 11 new
ships equipped with modern weapon system.
B. THE OPERATING FLEET OF THE HOIAL THAI NAVY
The Operating Fleet is the most important unit in the
Royal Thai Navy because it is the sea combat force. The
primary missions of the Operating Fleet [Bef. 1] are:
(1) The attainment of the nation's objectives by use of
naval forces to prevent attack by sea.
(2) The protection of the national's vital interest.
(3) The protection of transportation routes of the mari-
time vessels during wartime.
(4) The support of Army's combat operations from the sea
during wartime.
Fullfilling these missions requires the best efforts of
capable, dedicated people. Any less effort poses a danger
to the nation.
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1 • Organization of the Operating Fleet
The Operating Fleet, one of the several units in the
Eoyal Thai Nav^-, is commanded by the Commander in Chief of
the Royal Thai Navy. The Operating Fleet consists of four
ship squadrons: Patrol squadron, Anti-Submarine squadron.
Mine squadron, and Amphibious squadron. The organization of
the Operating Fleet is shown in Figure 2.1










Figure 2. 1 Organization of the Operating Fleet.
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2 . Strength of Forces
The Operating Fleet consists currently of 90 ships.
Fifty nine of the various ships serve in the Patrol
Squadron, six Frigates serve in the Anti-Submarine Squadron,
four Mine Sweeping Coastal ships and one Mine Tender ship
serve in the Mine Squadron, ten landing ships and six
service ships serve in the Amphibious Squadron [fief- 2].
The number and type of ships in each squadron are shown in
Table I.
C. PEESOHFEL IH THE OPERATING FLEET
The personnel in Royal Thai Navy ships are comprised of




There are two kinds of officers serving in the Navy
ships. There are officers who graduated from the Navy
Academy and the officers that have been promoted from the
petty officers who graduated from the Naval Rating School.
2 Petty Offic ers
There are two kinds of the petty officers serving in
the Navy ships. They are the Naval Rating School graduated
petty officers and the petty officers who are promoted from
the enlisted men. About ninety five percent of the petty
officers are graduates of the Naval rating School, and only
about five percent of the petty officers have been promoted
from the enlisted ranks [Eef. 3]. The number of the Navy's
enlisted men who were promoted to petty officers during
1982-198U are shown in Table II. There ara four petty
grades, namely: petty officer grade 1, petty officer grade
2, petty officer grade 3, and chief petty officer.
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_TABLE I
The Current Navy Ship Typ es
Type Displacement Officer Petty
(Tons) Officer
a. Parol Squadron:
6 Fast Strike Craft (missil e) 250 7 37
3 Fast Strike Craft (Gun) 450 7 39
10 Large Patrol Craft 280 7 29
20 Patrol Gun Motor Boat 100 3 15
2U Fast Patrol Craft 20 1 9
b. Anti-Submarine Squadron:
1 Frigate "Yarow" Class 1800 16 124
2 Frigate "PF103" Class 1000 12 80
1 Frigate "Cannon" Class 1900 12 95
2 Frigate "Tacoma" Class 1445 12 91
c. Mine Squadron:
U Mine Sweeping Coastal 362 7 20
1 Mine Tender 1000 9 37
d. Amphibious Squadron:
5 Landing Ship Tank 3640 10 63
5 Landing Ship Medium 380 8 25
2 Transport Ship 815 7 27
2 Tanker 960 6 19









Fiscal Year Total Enlisted Men Promoted
to P01
Percent
1982 12^627 473 3.75
1983 13,239 630 4.76
1984 13,240 605 4.57
3- Enlisted Men
There is only one kind of enlisted man serving in
the Royal Thai Navy. The Navy recruits the enlisted men by
draft. They serve in the Navy for two years. During the
first six months, enlisted men have to be trained at the
Navy Recruits Training School. This results in only one
year and six months of actual service time on board ship.
If an enlisted man who was graduated from the secondary
school prefers to continue staying in the Navy, the Navy
will promote him to petty officer grade 1 after he has
completed a 2 year-tour. However, as stated earlier, there
were small numbers of enlisted men who continued in the
Navy.
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D. PISET PEBSOIHEL fBOBLEH
The major manpower problem of the Operating Fleet is the
shortage of petty officers due to high attrition rates.
There is only 8 1 percent of the approved manning level of
petty officers serving on each ship [ Eef . 4]- When the
ships sail to the sea for operating missions, the personnel
from the other ships on the base will be temporarily moved
to fill the vacancies during the sea period. The current
number of petty officers in each sc^uadron is shown in Table
III.
TABLE III
Current Petty Officer in the Operating Fleet
Unit Squadron 100 Percent Current Shor'tage
Patrol 1276 1176 100 ( 8 %)
Anti-Submarine 885 621 264 (30 %)
Mine 339 258 81 (24 %)
Amphibious 106U 845 219 (21 %)
Total 3564 2900 664 (19 %)
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III. PETTY .OFFICER fiEfiOIRBMENTS FOfi THE OPERATING FLEET
A. BACKGROOHD OH PETTY OFFICER REQOIREHENTS
The Eoyal Thai Navy has proposed an expansion of its
Naval Forces over the next 5 years as part of plan to revi-
talize the defense capacity. The Royal Thai Navy believes
that this higher level is necessary to meet the growing
threat posed by Vietnam. The majority of these ships would
be "deployable" combatants built to support or add to the
Navy's ship squadrons the predominent naval force structure
used today.
The Navy requirements for military manpower are deter-
mined both by the size of the operating squadrons and by the
missions to which the various ships and support groups are
assigned. In the event of wartime mobilization, their crews
would be augmented by reserve personnel. In addition to its
seagoing forces, the Navy maintains a large number of shore
facilities where personnel perform ship maintenance,
training, medical, engineering, and support functions.
Shore jobs that can provide additional combat capability
during wartime are normally filled with military personnel,
while civilians are used for noncombat-related positions-
For example, minor repair and maintenance of ships is
usually done by military personnel since this work would
probably be performed at sea during a conflict, whereas
major ship overhaul is conducted in the naval shipyards with
civilian personnel.
Civilian personnel generally work in one location, while
active-duty military personnel rotate between sea and shore
duty assignments. The military personnel do not always
perform the same jobs on shore and at sea. For example.
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ships boiler technicians have no directly comparable job at
shore facilities and so are generally assigned other duties.
By contrast, — electronics repair personnel are required at
naval bases as well as aboard ships. During peacetime,
manpower and equipment levels often fall short of authorized
levels, which in turn are sometimes less than the formally
stated requirements. Such shortfalls arise at the cost of
reduced military preparedness but at a savings of resources
freed for other purposes. Given the various techniques for
determining requirements, and the constraints on resources,
it is not surprising that judgements vary regarding the
appropriate levels of authorizations and reguiraments.
The requirements determination process has occasionally
been challenged on several technical, but nonetheless impor-
tant, aspects. First, standard manning guidelines typically
specify a single configuration of the number and sXill
levels of personnel for a given task, but other configura-
tions such as fewer but more highly skilled personnel may be
able to accomplish the same task. If they spe::;ified alter-
native configuration, planners would have more latitude in
selecting the least costly one or in finding the one best
suited to the existing supply of personnel.
B. PETTY OFFICER EEQOIREHENTS FOR FLEET EXPAHSIOH
1 . Navy Fleet Plan
The growth in Navy manpower requirements will follow
closely the path of fleet expansion. Navy planning focuses
on the "deployable forces". Its objective is to build 11
additional ships equipped with modern weapon systems. These
ships are 2 Corvettes, 1 Landing Ship Tank, 2 Mine Hunters,
and 6 Large Patrol Craft [Ref. 5 ]• This plan will be
completed at the end of fiscal year 19S0. The projected






Ship Class 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 TOTAL
Corvette 1 1 - - - 2
Landing Ship Tank - 1 - - 1
Mine Hunter 2 - - - 2
Large Patrol Craft 1 1 1 1 2 6
Total 2 5 2 1 2 11
2. Pettx Officer Reguirements for the New Ships
A larger fleet will require more manpower. One
Corvette requires 50 petty officers, one Landing Ship Tank
requires 45 petty officers, one Mine Hunter requires 17
petty officers, and one Large Patrol Craft requires 18 petty
officers [Ref. 6]. If the fleet expands as planned, the
Navy projects an additional requirement for 287 petty offi-
cers by the end of 1990. The petty officer requirements as
projected are shown in Table V.
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_TABLE ?
Projected Petty Officer Requireaents for the Hew ships
Ship Type 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Corvette 50 50 - — - 100
Landing Ship Tank - 45 - - - 45
Mine Hunter - 34 - - - 34
Large Patrol Craft 18 18 18 18 36 108
Total 68 147 18 18 36 287
C. PETTI OFFICER REQDIHEHEHTS FOR THE CORRENT SHORTAGE
''
• The Development of Fleet Manpower* s Policy
As stated earlier, there are only 81 percent of
petty officers requirements serving on board ships in the
Operating Fleet. This shortage of personnel detracts from
the effectiveness of the new equipment on the ships. The
new weapons and their fire control systems are required to
be operated, tested, and maintained on a routine basis.
"With the lack of qualified operators and maintenance
personnel, the new equipment is usually in-operative when
needed.
The Royal Thai Navy is determined to strengthen the
Naval forces, so that they will be fully ready to preserve
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the security of the nation. Achieving this greater strength
reguires new, more capable weapons. However no Naval
forces, no ma.tter how well armed, is more capable than the
individaul and collective strengths of its Navy personnel.
For the Operating Fleet maintain the objective of Naval
mission effectively, all ships must be ready for immediate
sea operations. Thus, the Navy needs 100 percent manpower
for all ships [Eef. 7] to maintain and keep the ship's
equipment in good operating condition over a long period.
2- Current Pett^ Officer Requirements
The Navy planned to fill the shortage of manpower
for the purpose of readiness and mobilization of all ships
during the next 5 years by 20 percent or about 133 petty
officers per year. It will take some time to eliminate the
petty officer shortage completely. In recruiting the petty
officers, it reguires 2 years for training in the Naval
Eating school [Ref- 8 ]•
D. PROJECTED PETTY OFFICEH HEQOIBEMENTS
In order to increase the effectiveness of the Naval
Force by reducing the numbers of the shortage personnel and
in order to provide the personnel for fleet expansion, the
Navy projected an additional petty officer requirement of
951 persons in the next five years (1986-1990). The
projected petty officer requirements are shown in Table VI
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TABLE ?I
Projected Petty Officer Requirements
Onder Fleet Plan FTI 985- 1990
Eeguirement 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
For the Shortage 133 133 133 133 133 66 5
For the new ships 68 147 18 18 36 307
Total 201 280 151 151 169 952
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IV. SnPPLI_OF THE PETTY pFFICEB BECEOITS AHD RETAINED
The Naval Forces can be effective only if all of its
members subordinate their personal desires to the greater
purposes of the military organization. A civilian can quit
if he or she does not like a job, the supervisor or the
terms of employment; a military member is bound by an oath
cind a contract for specified service, and cannot bargain for
better terms. A civilian can choose where to take employ-
ment and where to live, a military member goes where offi-
cial orders say to go. The most stressful aspects of
military life, overtime work without pay, long tours at sea,
frequent moves, family separations and disruptions, and the
ultimate stress and danger of combat, are imposed without
choice on the part of the member.
There are civilian jobs that involve risk to life and
limb, and work under unpleasant circumstances. None of
these jobs, however, entails the surrender of :;hoice to the
degree that military service does. Danger and discomfort
are not shared evenly in the military community, but all
members are substantially equal in the loss of the freedom
of choice.
The unique conditions and demands of military service
require service members with special characteristics.
Military members, beyond having the physical and mental
abilities reguired for their jobs, must have a special
measure of dedication and loyalty to their comrades in arms
and their military organizations. These qualities must be
underlaid with a love of their country and its ideals.
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There are compensating factors that make the sacrifices
demanded of military members more acceptable. The intense
satisfaction TJf being relied upon as a member of a group
with a highly important mission, the camaraderie, the oppor-
tunities for assuming responsibilities and new challenges.
Without those intangible rewards a military organization
would not be effective. Clearly, however, there also must
be tangible benifits to provide fair compensation to our
military members in order to attract and retain the
talented, dedicated people that make the forces effective.
A. THE KEY FiCTOHS AFFECTING PETTI OFFICER RECEOITHEMT
The determination of petty officer requirements includes
not only what the Navy thinks they need in order to meet the
mission requirements, but also the reality of what they
think they can get and how much it costs. Several factors
will affect the supply of petty officers and, hence, the
ability of the Navy to meet its requirement.
1 . Demand for N oncomissioned Officers in 3t her Ser vices
The members of recruits willing to enter the Navy
will be influenced by the recruit demands of the other
Services. As part of plans to revitalize defense capa-
bility, the Army and the Air Force require growth in their
personnel forces in the same ratio as the Navy. The Air
Force will experience growth both in quantity and quality
over the next several years. This growth will be especially
competitive with the goal of the Navy petty officer require-
ment. In addition, the Air Force has traditionally enjoyed
higher retention rates than the Navy and, like the Army, can
boast a better record of minority progress than the Navy in
the noncomissioned officer and officer ranks.
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2. Military /Civilian Pax Ratio
Compensation can be an effective policy tool for
shaping the -size of the force as well as its skill and
experience mix. Changes in compensation change the attrac-
tiveness of military service, and that in turn affects
recruitment, retention, individual performence, and the
overall force profile. In many cases, the responsiveness of
recruitment or retention to a change in compensation can be
estimated with considerable accuracy. These estimates can
then be applied to evaluate the manpower consequences of
alternative compensation policies. This procedure of quan-
titative estimation and prediction has been used success-
fully in predicting the results of different recruiting and
retention incentives, ranging from across-the-board pay
increases and bonuses to educational and retirement
benefits. Therefore^ the costs of military manpower can be
viewed from different perspectives. By one perspective, the
costs indicate the budgetary outlays associated with a force
of existing size, skill, and experience. By another
perspective, the costs can be thought of as an outcome of
the process by which policy makers attempt to choose cost-
effective modifications of the compensation package, and, in
so doing, improve the recruitment, retention, or performance
of the force.
The size and distribution of military pay influ-
ences recruiting and retention. Increasing compensation and
monetary benefits will make Navy life more attractive. The
attrition rates of the navy personnel would reduce and
therefore make the Navy more effective.
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3- Labor Market Conditions
The economy of Thailand began to fall over a year
ago, and is expected tocontinue dropping over the next few
years. The Labor Department reported that there were 1.5
million Thai people unemployed in 1984, and the unemployed
would rise to 1.7 million in 1985, a 13 percent increase
[Ref- 9]. Rising unemployment makes recruiting more easy
because more persons leave the civilian market and more
recruits are willing to join the Navy.
B. THE KEY FACTOfiS APFECTING PETTI OFFICER RETEITIOH
The retention for members of the Navy is an important
indicator of the state of Naval forces manpower. Retention,
broadly speaking, is a decision made by a member of the
service and by his superiors for a commitment to continue on
active-duty. Retention factors are important elements of
policy analysis because of their implications for overall
management of the armed forces. Levels and types of mili-
tary compensation, for example, are often justified as
necessary for retaining qualified personnel. Considerations
about retention also affect many decisions about routine
personnel management, such as frequency of moves from one
station to another and the type of benefits provided to
dependents of military personnel. In addition to the
compensation, the labor market conditions also affect mili-
tary retention, for example, falling unemployment causes
lower retention rates because more persons leave the mili-
tary to pursue civilian opportunities.
C. PETTY OFFICER RECHOITING AND RETENTION'S TRENDS
The number of Naval ships is planned to grow, thus
increasing the demand for petty officers. The Navy must
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examine the prospects for meeting this growing requirement
for petty officers as the number of Navy ships increases.
Based on these assumptions, over the five years between
fiscal year 1986-1990, the Navy would add 952 petty officers
to its naval fleet. The growth would be concentrated in
1986 and 1987 when 481 petty officers would be added.
Success or failure in Navy recruiting and retention are
inevitably affected by the state of employment in the civi-
lain economy. A strong economy has the potential to hurt
both recruiting and retention, but a weak economy bouys Navy
manning. Meeting the goal of full reguirement can be met by
1990 if the Navy continues to maintain the competitive
military/civilain pay ratio. The determination of this
trend is based on the assumption that the favorable
recruiting experience of the past few years can be sustained
in the future. The number of applicants who want to enter
the Navy as petty officers has increased every year, the
selection ratio of the entrance examinations rose from 1/14
in 1983 to 1/20 in 1985 [Ref. 10]- The number of applicants
and the selection ratios from the 1983-1985 entrance exami-
nations are shown in Table VII. Although rising require-
ments for petty officers and noncommisioned officers in all
Services makes the recruitment less favorable, this trend
will be offset by increasing unemployment in civiiain
market.
In addition to more favorable recruitment, assuming
rising unemployment and maintenance of competitive military/
civiiain pay ratio, the retention of career petty officers
should be better than in the last few years. The attrition
rates of petty officers should decrease because it will be
more difficult to find new jobs in the civiiain market
better than those in the Navy,
28
_TABLE VII
Selection Ratio of Pettv Officer's Entrance
Examination FT 1983-1985
Fiscal Year Applicant Selected Selection Ratio
1983 16,831 1,190 1/14
1984 15,986 1,018 1/16
1985 16-372 796 1/20
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V. POLICY OgflOHS FOP IMPROVING RECRglTMENT AHD RETENTION
A military force is only as good as its members. A
force with dedicated, competent members has the potential
for success in combat. A force whose members lack dedica-
tion and competence is unlikely to succeed under the strains
of war. Critics have charged that the members of the
miltary force lack the qualities required to produce a
capable force. Specifically, the critics claim that
personnel of the military force lack the neccessary educa-
tion, aptitude and discipline. The central concern is that
presently there is no system in place to determine what is
good so that it can be nurtured and built upon, and to
determine what is unsatisfactory so that it can be
corrected.
The Royal Thai Navy has planned to develop the Naval
forces. Many new ships equipped with modern equipment and
weapon systems will replace the old ships. The increasing
technical nature of the Navy requires greater need for tech-
nically skilled personnel. The Navy must provide sufficient
qualified personnel to man the highly technical equipment
and weapon systems. The Navy must consider:
(1) How to attract sufficient quantity of high quality
petty officers.
(2) How to retain sufficient numbers of qualified petty
officers in order to prevent the future shortage of
petty officers.
Although, the recruiting plans indicate the potential to
meet the end strength goal on accession requirements, it is
valuable to consider policy options that can affect the
quantity, quality, and skills of personnel recruited and
retained. These options can help insure that sufficient
30
numbers of high quality individuals will enter the Navy.
They also aid in channeling personnel into hard-to-fill
occupations 3-nd in preventing future shortage of trained
personnel.
A. ATTBACTIHS HORE HIGH QOALITI PETTI OFFICER RECROITS
The relative ability of military personnel to learn
military skills and perform well in military units is
usually refered to as "quality" of the personnel. The
normal measure of quality for enlisted accessions are the
percentage that have passed the entrance examination. The
term "high quality" means the persons who scora high on the
test. In the U.S. military, "high quality personnel" are
refered to as the high school graduates whose scores on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) placed them in
categories I through IIIA (50 percentile or above)
.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) groups AFQT scores
into five broad categories and somtimes into finer subcate-
gories. Those in categories I and II are above average in
trainability, those in category III are average, those in
category IV are below average, and those in category V are
markedly below average [Ref. 11]- Table VIII shows the
percentile score for the various categories.
This form of quality measurement is very useful to
manpower policymakers because of its proven reliability and
because it can be readily quantified. AFQT scores are good
general indicators of the characteristics of the young
people received by the services. The experience of the last
30 years suggests that individuals who score high on the
AFQT are more likely to be successful in military training
than are more their lower scoring peers. Additionally,
individuals who score low on the AFQT are more likely to
have disciplinary problems. While there are some high
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TABLB fill
O.S. Trued Forces Qualification Test Scores
By Categories
AFQT Category Percentile Score Range
I 93 - 100
II 65 - 92
IIIA 50 - 6a
IIIB 3 1 - 49
IVA 21 - 30
IVB 16 - 20
IVC 10 - 15
V - 9
scoring personnel who prove ineffective and some low scoring
personnel who perform well, on the average, the higher an
individual's AFQT score, the greater the likelyhood of
successful military performance [Ref- 12]. The upper mental
category or high quality individuals is desired for his
ability to meet the technical education and skill require-
ment of many Navy jobs. The high quality individuals also
provide lower attrition rates than the low quality individ-
uals. High school graduates are desired, as their attrition
rates during the 1970* s were approximately one-half of the
attrition rates for non-high school graduates [Ref. 13 ]«
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1- Postseryice Educationa l Benefits
The recruiting force needs new tools to attract high
quality personnel. Continual increases in recruiting miss
the heart of the problem. For most youth today, the Navy no
longer holds out an image of providing an opportunity for
personnel development. The Navy must consider legislation
that would establish an educational assistance program that
will provide a substantial inducement to serve in the Navy.
One method that would attract more high quality
personnel to enter the Navy is a Postservice Educational
Benefits program. The program offers additional specific
education to the presonnel recruits. The purpose is to
encourage personnel to seek service in the Navy.
Additionally, this program is valuable to be used selec-
tively to assist recruiting in critical skill aceas.
During 1981, in a nationwide experiment, a U.S.
military Educational Assistance Test Program was conducted
to evaluate the effects of educational benefits on enlist-
ments. The experiment was mandated by Congress to test
several Veterans Educational Assistance Programs (VEAP) with
more generous benefits for high-quality enlistees. The
principal questions addressed by the test were:
(1) How effective were each of the test programs for
attracting high-quality recruits?
(2) What would be the effect on recruiting of elimi-
nating the VEAP contibution requirement?
(3) Can a targeted program restricted to enlistees
entering certain hard-to-fill specialties be used to
increase total enlistments?
{H) How can a new educational program best be structured
to assist recruiting while minimizing costs?
The test program yielded useful results. Firstly,
it provided the only strong evidence that a sufficiently
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generous program of veterans educational benefits can bring
high-guality recruits into the military. The O.S. Army*s
Ultra-Veterans. Educational Assisted Program raised Army
enlistments of high-quality males by about 9 percent.
Secondly, the test program has shown that a program of
educational benefits need not be open to all enlistees to
have an impact on total enlistments. In the Air Force, the
specialties open to the test programs accounted for less
than 20 percent of 1980 high-quality male enlistments, and
in the Navy only 10 percent, yet both services showed
substantial enlistment gains under the Tuition/Stipend
program. Finally, the educational benefits can be used to
channel high-quality enlistees into specific skills
[Bef. 14]. The details of the Educational Assistance Test
Program are described in Appendix A.
2» Enlistment B onuses
Enlistment bonuses can be used primarily as a tool
for channeling quality recruits into hard-to-fill special-
ties and for eliciting additional man-years of service in
those specialties. This method offers the bonuses to the
high-quality recruits who have stayed in the Navy for a
period of time. Using enlistment bonuses can attract more
high-quality personnel to stay in the Navy longer than
normal enlistment.
The U.S. Army's Enlistment Bonus Test, began in July
1982. For this test. Congress authorized bonuses to high-
quality enlistees in selected specialties who choose the
standard three-year or four-year tour. As the test results
become available over the course of the next year, enlist-
ment bonuses yeild an enlistment response that is larger




Another method for raising the number of high
quality recruits is advertisting. Increasing budgets and
improving the procedure of advertising can get more people
interested in the Navy. The Navy needs to make a psycholog-
ical campaign in order to induce the people to the Navy.
All kinds of advertising media such as television, radio,
newspapers, and posters, are good instruments for this
purpose.
The effects of advertising were studied in a 1980
D.S. Navy experiment. Advertising expenditures were
observed to have significant effect on the number of enlist-
ment contracts obtained. More enlistment contracts were
signed in the areas which increase! advertising expendi-
tures, and less enlistment contracts were signed in the
areas which reduced the advertising expenditures [Bef. 16].
B. IMPEOVING RETENTION OF CAREER PETTI OFFICERS
One of the best ways to offset the additional petty
officer requirements is to increase the retention of career
personnel. This may have several positive effects. First,
reducing the number of recruits needed. Seconi, preventing
future petty officer shortage. Third, retaining an indi-
vidual eases the pressure to bring in or train a replace-
ment. Then, the important key is to retain experienced
personnel, who can be more readily assigned to a job for
which he is suited, thereby raising his productivity. All
of these factors are capable of saving cost. For example,
reducing the number of recruits needed reduces the
recruiting and training costs. The Royal Thai Navy spent
$1,852 for the average training cost of one petty officer
re::ruit during fiscal year 1983-1984 [Ref. 17]. The details
of training cost are shown in Table IX.
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TABLE IZ
The Expenditures for One Petty Officer Becruit
















Retention factors are important elements of manpower
policy analysis because of their implications for overall
management. Variations of levels and types of military
compensation are often justified as necessary for retaining
qualified personnel. Considerations about retention also
affect many decisions about routine personnel management,
such as frequency of moves from one station to another and
the type of benefits provided to dependents of Navy
personnel. Additionally, job match and satisf ication is
also important to consider.
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1. Competitive Military Compensation
The level of military compensation has a substantial
effect on retention. Competitive compensation needs to be
in tangible forms such as basic pay, sea pay, retirement
pay, and professional pay, rather than in fringe benefits
because many people are unwilling or unable to provide esti-
mates of their annual regular military compensation, or the
values they place on fringe benefits. It is commonly
believed that many personnel are unaware of the tax advan-
tage of the cash basic. Surveys have shown that few
enlisted personnel have a clear idea of the concept of Basic
Military Compensation and will invariably underestimate the
value of their compensation [fief- 18].
2. lQ2L2Zi^ Living and Work in g Conditions
Poor living and working conditions such as working
in a rotation-imbalanced specialty, family separations, and
long tours at sea, discourage personnel from staying in the
Navy. Navy personnel accept arduous duty assisgnments and
freguent moves as a matter of course. However, the Navy has
a responsibility to provide housing and other facilities
for Navy members and their families that will serve to
offset the unavoidable hardships of Navy life. If the
living and working conditions are improved, less personnel
want to leave the Navy, thus reducing the attrition rate of
petty officers.
3. Job Hatch and Satisfaction
One factor that influences attrition behavior of the
Naval petty officers is job match and satisfaction. In
making job assignments, the Navy mast weigh job availability
and aptitude as well as preference. Nevertheless, an
assignment scheme that placed petty officers in undesirable
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or hastily considered jobs could increase attrition and
obviate the goal of shifting manpower into needed occupa-
tions. The —process by which a recruit is "fit" with a
specific military job may be indicative of the quality of
the match. The new petty officers who are not knowledgeable
about military jobs, their qualifications for those jobs, or
even about what type of job they desire are less able to
discriminate among jobs for which they are well-suited.
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~VI- CONCLUSION
The Royal Thai Navy has planned to build 11 new ships
equipped with modern weapon systems during the next 5 years
as part of a plan to revitalize the national defense
capacity. A larger fleet will reguire more manpower. The
Navy estimates an additional requirement of 287 petty offi-
cers for manning the new ships. In addition to petty
officer requiement for the new ships, the Navy projected a
requirement of 665 petty officers to fill the vacancies of
the current petty officer shortage in order to improve the
effectiveness and the readiness of the naval forces.
The determination of factors affecting personnel supply
during the build up period shows that the Navy can meet the
full petty officer requirement by fiscal year 1990 as
planned. However, the Navy must consider the quality of
personnel recruits. Increasing technology in weapon systems
causes greater need for high skilled technical i-e^sonnel for
operating and maintaining these weapons over a long period.
The experience of the past suggests that high quality indi-
viduals perform their jobs better than low quality individ-
uals. There are several methods that would attract more
high quality personnel to enter the Navy. Postservice
educational benefits, enlistment bonuses, and advertising
are usually good methods for attracting high quality
personnel recruits.
In addition to consideration of the quality of personnel
recruits, the Navy must consider the retention of career
personnel. Increasing retention would reduce the number of
recruits needed, thus decreasing recruiting and training
cost. Increasing retention also lowers the future shortage
of skilled personnel. Considerations about retention affect
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maay decisions. Competitive military compensation,
improving living and working condition, job match and satis-
faction are _the important considerations for retaining
career personnel.
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O-S. MILITARY EDOCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TEST PROGHAM
In 1976 Congress terminated the largest federal program
of direct student assistance, the GI Bill. Although past
servicemembers would continue to be eligable for GI Bill
benifits, persons enlisting after December 31, 1976, were
offered only the less generous Veterans Educational
Assistance Program (VEAP) . In switching from the GI Bill to
VEAP, Congress substantially reduced the maximum dcllor
amount of the services' educational benefit offering. To
receive benefits under VEAP, enlistees must make monthly
contributions of $25 to $100, which are later matched two-
for-one by the Veterans Administration. The maximum indi-
vidual contribution is $2,700, yeilding a total possible
payout of $8,100 to meet expenses for college or vocational
training.
Recruiting results in the years following the introduc-
tion of VEAP were disappointing. Although no direct link
has been established between the termination of the GI Bill
and these poor results, in 1978 Congress moved to enhance
the basic VEAP benefit, calling for a test of lump-sum
enhancements, called "kickers", for high-guality youths-high
school graduates scoring at or above the 50th percentile on
the military aptitude test. The results of this early test
were inconclusive, however, and the recruiting problems
continued. Dissatisfaction with VEAP mounthed in the
services and in Congress, where proposals to expand or
replace VEAP were actively considered in 1980.
The result was a large-scale test of more generous
educational benefit program, mandated by Congress for fiscal
year 1981. Three parties were involved in the development
of the test programs:
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(1) The army requested permission to test larger
kickers.
(2) The House of Representatives authorized a test of a
new program modeled after the World War II GI Bill.
(3) The Senate Armed Services Commitee called for a test
of VEAP without the requirement that the individual
contribute-
Each program was offered in a "test cell" consisting of
a set of geographically dispersed areas of the country. In
the remainder of the country, the control cell, the servi-
ces* educational benefit offering remained as they were
during 1980. The Rand Corporation designed the set of area
assignments that matched the cells on a number of criteria
to ensure that, at the beginning of the test, recruiting
conditions were approximately the same in all the cells.
The test was set to run from December 1, 1980, through
September 30, 1981.
The details of the four test programs were as follows:
Control program: basic, contributory VEAP in services
kickers of up to $6,000 for qualifying Army enlistees only.
Ultra-VEAP kicker program: identical to control program
except Army kickers raised to a maximum of $12,000.
Noncontributory VEAP program: DoD payment of the VEAP
contribution for qualifying enlistees in all services. Army
kickers of up to $6,000.
Tuition/Stipend Program: for qualifying enlistees in all
services; tuition assistance ($1 ,200/year) plus subsitance
allowance ($300/month) , for up to four academic years,
benefits indexed for inflation, option for benefits to be
transferred to dependents or cashed out upon reenlistment
,
no extra benefits for Army enlistees.
Three features of the test programs were particularly
important. First. as noted above, in the control cell each
of the services offered only the educational benefit plan it
U2
had offered nationwide in 1980- Thus the control cell indi-
cated what the year-to-year change in recruiting conditions
would have b^^n nationwide had there been no special test
programs. Second, all of the test programs, and the Army
kickers in the control program, were limited to certain
enlistees: higher quality individuals enlisting in one of a
designated set of "critical skills". The designated
specialties covered a majority of Army job openings, but
only about 20 percent of Air Force and 10 per::ent of Navy
openings. Third, in all of the test cells but one-the
Tuition/Stipend cell, the Army offered substantially greater
benefits than the Navy, Air force, and Marine Corps.
To determine the gross enlistment effects of the
programs in the three services, by comparing each test cell
with the control cell in terms of their gains in high-
quality male enlistments between a base period (December
1979-September 1980) and the test period (December
1980-September 1981). For example, in the Army the control
cell showed a 21-7 percent gain, and the Ultra-VEAP kicker
cell a 32.3 percent gain, yielding an estimate of the effect
of the kicker program of approximately 9 percent. The
experiment also developed a regression model to control for
outside factors affecting enlistments, local labor market
conditions and recruiting effort-but the regression results
did not substantially change the estimates.
Each of the test program increased enlistments of high-
quality males in at least one of the services. The Army's
Dltra-VEAP kicker program raised Army enlistments by 9
percent. The Noncontributory VEAP program, offered in all
the services, raised enlistments by a statistically signifi-
cant amount only for the Air Force (5 percent) . Finally,
the Tuition/Stipend program showed increases of 10 and 8
percent in the Navy and Air Force, respectively, but reduced
Army enlistments by 6 percent. This decline was apparently
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a result of the equalizing of benefits across the services
under that program. The converse effect, however, did not
occur. Navy^-and Air Force recruiting was not hurt by the
Army Kickers in the Ultra-VEAP cell. These cross-service
effects indicate that educational benefits may be less
active at bringing recruits into the Army than into the
Navy and The Air Force, and that the Army could be hurt if a
new program of educational benefits did not maintain the
current differential for the Army.
An examination of enlistments by military specialty
indicates that the test programs were able to channel enlis-
tees into the eligible specialties in the Army and Air Force
(specialty data were not available for the Navy) . The skill
channelling effect was pronounced in the Army, where enlist-
ments in the eligible specialties under the Oltra-VEAP
kicker program rose sufficiently to absorb all of the total
enlistment gain attributable to the program. Even the
Tuition/Stipend program, which produced no enlistment gain
for the Army, shifted recruits into the covered skills. The
data also showed that when the Army list of eligible
specialties was expanded beyond the combat arms, recruiting
for the combat arms hurt. Skill channelling was much less
apparent in the Air Force, many enlistees attracted to the
Air Force by the Noncontributory V2AP and Tuition/Stipend
programs chose specialties that did not qualify them for the
special benefits- The results suggest that the narrowly
targeted program can increase enlistments by an amount that
is out of proportion to the limites number of jobs covered,
and do so at a cost per additional recruit that probably is
lower than that of a general program under which everyone
brought in by the program may ultimately receive the
benefits.
(1) The test results have the following implications for
future policy:
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Serious consideration should be given to retaining a
contribution requirement in any new military educa-
tional- benefits program. The requirement does not
discourage enlistments, but it does reduce costs.
(2) Skill targeting should be used as ani additional
means for limiting program costs. A targeted
program can channel benefit-attracted enlistees into
hard-to-fill specialties, but more important from a
cost standpiont, it ensures that most of the program
dollars spent go to those enlistees with the
greatest commitment to pursuing further education.
(3) In the design of a new program, the special problems
faced by the Army should be recognized. The test
has shown that one means of assisting the Army is to
build more generous educational benefits into the
Army program. However, some alternative enlistment
incentive or pragram might be a more cost-effective
way of giving the Army any special help it might
need.
These conclusions provide a framework for the design of
a relatively cost-effective program of military educational
benefits. They should not be taken to imply, however, that a
new program, or even retention of the existing VEAP (plus
Army kickers) , is necessarily desirable. Although the
Educational Assistance Test Program has shown that a
contributory, targeted program woald be more cost effective
than a general entitlement, it is not currently possible to
determine exactly how costly such a program would be. It is
important, therefore, to make the policy decision only after
a close examination of the effectiveness and costs of
alternative means and bonuses, additonal recruiters, or
advertising, for example, for bringing highly qualified
individuals into the military services.
( Source: P.ef. 14 )
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